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I . INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate several alter-
native procedures for making collective decisions regarding the 
provision of discrete public goods. Although much attention has 
recently been focused on the design of procedures which elicit the 
true preferences of a population in order to make efficient decisions1, 
we will show that each of those proposed possess undesirable proper-
ties given the nature of our problem. 
Let us begin by summarizing the particular application that 
led us to this investigation. For each of the past three years, the 
Public Broadcasting System (PBS) has selected programs to be broadcast 
through a market process. This experimental market, called the 
Station Program Cooperative (SPC), enables each of the approximately 
150 member stations to make purchase decisions out of an initial set 
of approximately 130 proposed programs. As far as the stations are 
concerned, each potential program is a public good in as much as the 
transmission costs of providing it to more than one station are 
assumed to be zero. While one might imagine that the quantity of a 
program provided might legitimately be varied over a certain range 
(e.g. by varying the number of episodes or the length of time of 
each episode), the nature of the present institution generally does 
not allow for these quantity adjustments. Thus we are confronted 
with a problem in the provision of discrete public goods where 
stations must make collective decisions to either accept or reject 
each program proposal. 
We will proceed to discuss and analyze the existing 
mechanism along with several alternatives. As we shall see, each 
:2 
mechanism specifies a message space in which stations may communicate, 
a decision rule for accepting or rejecting each program, and a tax 
rule which levies lump-sum amounts on each station. The choice of 
message space is by no means an insignificant one. As we shall see, 
it may be the major shortcoming of the present SPC procedure since 
each station is confronted with prices for each program and may 
communicate only its willingness to but or not buy. 
We will require that each candidate procedure satisfy the 
following requirements: 
1. The center may not run a deficit -- i.e. , the total 
revenues collected from stations must not be less than 
the total cost of all programs provided. 
2. No station may go bankrupt -- i . e. ,  the total amount 
collected from a station must not exceed its programming 
budget. 
3. The bundle of programs produced must not be Pareto 
dominated by any other feasible bundle -- i.e., there 
is no other bundle which satisfies 1) and 2) such that 
each station is at least as well-off with this bundle 
and at least some station is strictly better off. 
The existing mechanism will be analyzed in Section II 
and several alternatives which have been found in the literature 
will be examined in later sections. Unfortunately, ou.r results 
are largely negative. For the current SPC procedure we will show 
that although 1) and 2) are guaranteed due to the nature of the 
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price adjustment algorithm, an equilibrium may not exist and if it 
does it may not satisfy 3). Due to this we will then proceed to 
examine two other classes of procedures. In Section III, we will 
examine the mechanism suggested by Dreze and de la Vallee Poussin [2] 
and Malinvaud [10]. Under their mechanism it must be assumed that 
each station does not take the other stations' decisions as given, 
but must act as though the decisions of the other stations are those 
that are the least favorable to it. In other words, stations will be 
assumed to make "minimax" decisions. As they have shown, when the 
quantity of a public good provided may be varied continuously, this 
mechanism will lead stations to correctly reveal their preferences 
except at corner solutions. With discreteness, however, all 
solutions are corner solutions and we shall see that, in general , a 
station will not necessarily reveal its true preferences. 
In Section IV, we will examine the class of mechanisms 
which are strongly individual incentive compatible. This class has 
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been extensively studied previously by Green and Laffont [5,6,7) 
and Groves [7] for the case of a single discrete public good. If 
there is more than one such good, we will prove that there does not 
exist a mechanism satisfying 1), 2), and 3) for which each station 
has a dominant strategy. More specifically, our result points out 
the futility of a search for a mechanism which elicits the truthful 
willingness to pay for each public good from each member of the 
population. Due to this result we will proceed to discuss some 
weaker notions of incentive compatibility and related mechanisms in 
Section V. 
I I. THE SPC PROCEDURE 
The existing SPC procedure may be summarized as follows 
(for further information see Ferejohn and Noll [3] ). At each stage 
of the process, each station is confronted with a price for each pro­
gram and asked to indicate which programs it would be willing to 
purchase at these prices. Using these decisions the center calcu­
lates new prices such that if the purchase decisions of all stations 
remain unchanged, the total revenue collected on all produced 
programs will exactly cover their costs. The process reiterates 
until it converges. 
At the heart of this mechanism is a formula for computing 
the cost share of a station on each program at each iteration. This 
share is based upon the progrannning budget of the station and the 
population of the area it serves relative to the budgets and the 
population served by all stations which indicated a willingness to 
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purchase the program on the previous iteration. More precisely, the 
price, p� (t + 1), of program j to station i at time t + 1 is computed J 
as 
where 
i p j ( t + 1) 
( Bi 8 .+ . 2 
l: BkZ�(t) + B1 
kfi J 




Nk the population of the area served by station k, 
C,: the cost of producing program j, J 
\c 
+ N/ j 
Z
�
(t): the purchase decision of station k at time t to accept J 
(Z� (t) = 1) or reject (Z� (t) = 0) program j. J J 
We should be careful to note that the current procedure does allow 
for the exclusion of stations from use of a particular program. 
Specifically, if the process converges and a station has indicated 
it does not wish to purchase a program at its current cost share, 
then the station is not charged for that program and is excluded 
from using it. 
As stated in the previous section, one of the major 
difficulties that arises here is that a station may only indicate 
its willingness to buy or not buy at a given set of prices. A 
station which is willing to pay some amount for a program which is 
less than the price it faces may only decline to purchase the pro-
gram and has no way to communicate a bid. Neither does a station 
which is willing to pay more than the current price have any way to 
signal the intensity of its preference. 
6 
In addition to this difficulty this procedure has several 
other unfortunate features: 
1) Equilibria need not be efficient. 
2) There may be multiple equilibria which may be Pareto-ranked. 
3) If there are multiple equilibria, the efficient equilibium 
may be unstable. 
4) No equilibrium may exist. 
We can illustrate these points by means of two simple examples. 
Without loss of generality, we will use a simplified version of the 
price formula given above, namely 
i Bi C. p. ( t + 1) = k k . J J l:B Z.(t)+B1 
kfi J 
Example 1: 
Suppose there are two stations whose preferences are represent-
able by the utility functions 
and 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 U (z1, z2, y  ) = 3Zl + 2z2 + .ly 
2 2 2 2 2 
U (Z1, z2, y ) = 2Z1 
2 2 + 3Z2 + . ly 
where y i is the amount of some private good consumed by station i. 
Each station is endowed with 5 units of the private good (B1 = B2 = 5) 
and may choose from a list of two programs each with a cost of five 
(C1 
= c2 
= 5). It may be verified that there are multiple equilibria 
in this example which are given by 
1 p 
zl 













(2 . 5,2. 5) 
(1,1) .  
The second equilbria clearly Pareto dominates the first . It may 
also be shown that the efficient equilibrium is unstable. To 
see this consider the following prices: 
1 . p (O) = (2 . 5,2 . 5  + s) 2 p (O) = (2.5,2.5) 
Iterating through the algorithm for calculating prices and demands 
will give the following cycle: 
z1(0) = (1,0) z2(0) = (1,1) 
1 p (1) = (2 . 5, 2 . 5) 
2 p (1) = (2 . 5,5) 
z1(1) = (1,1) z2(1) = (0, 1) 
1 p (2) = (5,2 . 5) 2 p (2) = (2 . 5,2.5) 
z1(2) = (1,0) z
2
(2) = (1,1) 
1 1 p (3) = (2.5,2 . 5) = p (1) 
2 2 p (3) = (2 . 5,5) = p (1) 
Example 2: 
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To show that no equilibria may exist with this procedure, let 
and 
1 1 1 1 U (z1,z2,y ) 
1 1 1 1 z1 z2 + z1 + . ly , 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
U (Z1,z2,y ) = max(z1,z2) + .ly , 
1 2 where B = 8, B = 8, c1 = 6 and c2 5 . The driving force in this 
example is that station 2 will always choose only one program -- the 
one with the lowest price . On the other hand, station 1 will only 
choose program 2 when it can afford to also select program 1 .  This 
will occur only when station 2 has selected the first program, since 
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when station 2 has chosen the second program, the first station is 
given the prices p� 2 6 and pl = 2. 5  and cannot afford to purchase 
both . On the other hand, when station 2 purchases the first program, 
the first station can afford to purchase both programs. But this 
action will cause the price of the second program to be less than 
the first to station 2 (p� = 3 and p� = 2.5) and thus station 2 will 
revert to choosing program 2. 
Assuming initial prices of p1(0) = p2(0) = (6,5) and 
iterating through the algorithm gives the following sequences of 
prices and demands: 
z1(0) = (1,0) z
2
(0) = (0,1) 
1 p (1) = (6,2.5) 2 p (1) = (3,5) 
z1(1) = (1,0) z
2
(1) = (1,0) 
1 p (2) = (3,5) 
2 
p (2) = (3,5) 
z1(2) = (1, 1) z
2
(2) = (1,0) 
1 p (3) = (3,5) 
2 
p (3) = (3, 2.5) 
z1(3) = (1,1) z
2
(3) = (0, 1) 
1 p (4) = (6,2.5) 2 p (4) = (3, 2.5) 
z1(4) = (1,0) z
2
(4) = (O,l) 
1 1 p (5) = (6,2.5) = p (1) 
2 2 p (5) = (3,5) = p (1) 
Thus, with these initial prices, the algorithm will lead to a cycle . 
Furthermore, we assert by the above logic that with any other initial 
prices we will immediately generate a set of purchase decisions for 
both stations which are found at an iteration in the above cycle . 
Therefore, no stationary point can be found . 
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Because of the need to find a stable equilibrium within 
a small number of iterations, two additional rules have been 
adopted. First, programs which are not generating revenues to cover 
a predetermined fraction of their costs in a given iteration are 
dropped from consideration. This predetermined fraction rises as the 
number of iterations increase. Second, once all but a few programs 
that are likely to be purchased have been eliminated, the center 
announces that all stations will be required to continue selecting 
a program that they selected in the previous iteration if the price 
does not increase. These two rules do succeed in guaranteeing the 
convergence of the process at some loss of efficiency since outside 
of the context of the SPC rules, the final list of programs pur-
chased may not even be an equilibrium. 
One final drawback of this procedure should also be 
pointed out . Programs which generate little support in the early 
rounds of the process are likely to have their prices rise so 
rapidly that they never receive future support. As an extreme 
example of this, consider a program which is not purchased by any 
station in the first round. All stations will be confronted with a 
price equal to the full cost of that program in the second round and 
it is indeed unlikely that it will ever be purchased. 
III. THE MINIMAX PROCEDURE 
As an alternative mechanism to the existing procedure, 
we investigated the properties of a process adopted from Dreze and 
de la Vallee Poussin [2] and Malinvaud [10]. One of the virtues of 
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this process, relative to the existing one, is that the message 
space in which each station may communicate is not as constrained. 
Instead of communicating purchase decisions at each stage of the 
planning procedure, each station is asked to communicate what it 
would be willing to pay for the introduction of an unproduced 
program, or, for a produced program, what compensation it would 
require to remain just as well off after the deletion of the program 
as it would have been without the deletion. On the other hand, as 
pointed out in the introduction, this procedure has one major draw-
back -- namely, it requires that each station assume that the other 
stations' decisions are those which are the least favorable to it. 
However, ignoring this assumption for the moment, we will proceed 
to examine this process. 
The planning mechanism we propose here is a mapping 
PS P S . F: R + {O,l} x R where the inputs to the planning procedure at 
each stage are vectors, mi(Z), one for each station describing 
their willingness to pay for each program given that the system is 
currently in social state z. 
. p s Here z = (x,y) E {O,l} x R is the 
social state where zi = Ki' i = l, • • .  , P, indicates whether or not 
program i is being produced, and zp+i = yi, i = l, • . •  ,S, is the 
amount of the private good which station i possesses in this state. 
Given an initial decision by the center, z(O), the stations are 
1 s asked to report the vector (m (z(O)), • • •  ,m (z(O))). The center 
computes z(l), etc., according to the following rule. 
Rule: Given z(t) and (m1(z(t)), . . •  ,m5(z(t))), the index set J, 
programs eligible for a status change is defined as 
J = {j I [Zm�(z(t)) - C.>O and z.(t) = OJ or 
i J J J 
[Zm
�
(z(t)) - C.<O and z.(t) = l]} . 
i J J J 
If J = 0, the process terminates. Otherwise choose jE:J 
such that J Zm�(z(t)) - C. 
i J J 
I ..'.': I �� czCt)) - ck I for a11 
l 
i k E: J, and set zj(t + 1) = 1 - zj(t) and zk(t + 1) = zk(t) 
for k •= 1, . . . ,P,k/j. 
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Given the selection of zj(t + 1), j = l, ... ,P, the center computes 
the allocation of the private good, zi(t + 1), i = P + l, . . .  ,P + S, 
as 
zi(t + 1) - zi(t) 
p 
Z (z.(t + 1)  
j=l J 
i z. (t))m. (z(t)) 
+ � o�( � m�(z(t)) 
j=l J i=l J 
l J 
- c.)(z.(t + 1) - z.(t)) J J J 
. s i where 6� � 0, zo. 
J � i=lJ 
1 for j = l, . • .  ,P. 
In other words, at each iteration the center cannot change 
the status of a program which either is currently being produced and 
had a positive surplus (Zm� - c. > O) or is not being produced and
i � J 
has a negative surplus l (Zmj - cj 
< 0). From the remaining list of 
programs, the center changes the status of the program with the 
biggest absolute surplus. For this change, the center charges each 
station its reported willingness to pay and redistributes any surplus 
according to fixed sharing rules oi. 
i2 
We could assume that each station is correctly revealing 
their true preferences and proceed to show that this process is
monotonic in that for each social state, each station is at least 
as well off as with the social state of the previous iteration. 
Further, under this assumption, the rule has a stable point which is 
optimal. The difficulty with this lies with the assumption of correct 
revelation. Indeed, even if stations exhibit minimax behavior, such 
will not be the case. In the continuous analog of this model in 
which any non-negative amount of the public good may be produced, 
Dreze has shown that if the amount supplied is zero, then there are 
no penalties associated with the under-reporting of preferences 
since no further decrease in the amount supplied can be contemplated. 
More generally stated one can prove that truthful revelation is 
minimax except at corner solutions and, unfortunately, in our problem 
every feasible allocation is a corner. Thus we are lead to search 
for another alternative. 
IV. AN INDIVIDUALLY INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE PROCEDURE 
Recently a body of literature has evolved in which attention 
has been devoted to designing mechanisms which elicit the true tastes 
of the population. Groves [8] has studied one such process in which 
it is in every individual's interest to announce his true preference 
for a public good independent of the announcements of the rest of the 
population. As opposed to the minimax assump t ion of the previous 
section, this is the competitive assumption since each member of the 
population takes the messages of all other members as given. In 
environments with separable utility functions, these mechanisms 
have the property that truthful revelation of preferences is a 
dominant strategy for each agent and a Pareto optimal decision is 
taken. In a number of papers, Green and Laffont [5,6,7] have 
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extensively studied this mechanism and have shown that any mechanism 
which makes Pareto optimal decisions and for which dominant 
strategies exist is isomorphic to a Groves mechanism. 
The difficulty that arises in applying this procedure is 
that with the exception of [6] none of these papers imposed a 
constraint on the taxes which may be imposed on each agent and 
thus bankruptcy was generally feasible. Green and Laffont narrowed 
the class of Groves' mechanisms to take account of this no-bankruptcy 
condition in the case of one discrete public good. 
The result which we wish to pursue here is to attempt to 
extend this analysis to the cases of more than one public good and 
impose a no-bankruptcy condition on each individual and a no-deficit 
condition on the center. To do this we will need to use the 
following notation repeatedly: 
mi: The message communicated by station i,
m)i(: (S - 1)-tuple of messages communicated by all stations 
except station i, 
i 1 s )i( M (c1, ... ,Cp,B, ... ,B,m ): The message space correspondence 
Q 
of station, 
{O,l}p x R!: The set of possible allocations for which no 
station faces bankruptcy, 
rt 
{ p 
. s < 
(x,y)Ert l L Ckxk .. + Lyk 
k=l . - k=l
s ) 
rnk). 
k=l ' . 
the set of tMsibi1:> 
allocations for which no station faces bankruptcy and 
for which the center does not incur a deficit. 
With these definitions, we have imposed a certain structure on the 
institution. The set of admissible messages may depend only on 
observable data (namely, the costs of the programs, the budgets of 
t4 
the stations, and the messages of all other stations). Secondly, the 
set of possible allocations, rt, has restricted allocations of the 
private good to the non-negative orthant to ensure no bankruptcy 
can occur. Finally, the set of feasible allocations, rt, guarantee 
that the center cannot run a deficit since, if we regard tk 
= Bk - yk 
A 
as the lump sum tax paid by station k, the set rt requires 
s > L tk k=l 
p 
L Ckxk. k=l 
Given the message space, we may now define our 




tions. More specifically let F: � M1 + Q where M1 denotes the range 
i=l 
of Mi. 
In order to compare different allocations in Q, we will need to 
assume that each station has a preference relation, R., which is 
l 
defined on Q. This relation is assumed to be complete, transitive, 
and reflexive. Further, let Pi denote the asymmetric part of Ri and 
let Ii denote the symmetric part. 
With these definitions we can now define the notion of 
admissible dominant strategies: 
Definition: Fis non-strategic if and only if Vi = l, ... ,S, 
:!!m.EMi such that for each m)i(EM)i( 
1 
)i( A )i( F(mi,m )RiF(mi,m ) 
A i for all miEM . 
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In the case where the dominant strategy for each agent was his true 
preference, the mechanism is said to be strongly individually 
incentive compatible (SIIC). Such may not be the case here, in as 
much as the SIIC strategy may be inadmissible (as in [6]). 
The definition of Pareto optimality creates some diffi-
culty in this setting. The ordinary definition of optimality 







E Cix.) for each S-tuple of messages. 1=1 1 
As shown by 
Green and Laffont [7], this requires that F can not be non-
strategic. Due to this, we have chosen to relax the usual effi-
ciency requirement with the following: 
Defiinition: (x,y) is said to Pareto-dominate (x' ,y') if and 
only if 
and 
(i) xk f xk for some k 1, .. . ,P 
(ii) (x,y)R. (x' ,y') V i = 1,.,, ,S and (x,y)P. ( x' ,y') ·1 
J 
for some j = l, . • .  S. 
(iii) x +· < Bi '<:/ i E S p 1 -
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Thus we will consider one alternative to Pareto-dominate another if 
and only if it differs on the set of programs selected, it is non-
distributive and the usual def ini t ion of Pareto domination, (ii),
holds. We will call this mechansim weakly efficient when F(m) 
selects the maximal elements of �. 
With these definitions, we hoped to construct a class of 
mechanisms which were weakly efficient and non-strategic. Indeed, 
in [6], the authors have constructed such a class in the case of 
a single public good. What we discovered in the case P � 2, was 
that no such mechanism existed. This can be shown by way of the 
following example. Let us begin by examining a special class of 
preferences which we denote by L. A preference relatl.Qu is 
in L if there is a vector (v1, ... ,vp) of non-negative numbers such 
+ p i > that for each (x,y), (x',y' ) E �. (x,y)Ri(x',y') � E x.v. 
+ 
yi = j=l J J 
p i E x'.v. + y'. Now suppose there are two stations with preference 
j =l J J i 
relations in L and two programs with C = Cl = c2 = B
l + B2 . If 
station i has preferences (vi, v�) such that 
where 
1 2 1 2 v1 + v1 > c1 and v2 + v2 < c2 
1 1 1 2 2 
c1 > v2 > v1 > B and c1 > v1 > B , 
weak efficiency requires that F(m) = (1,0,0,0). Alternatively, 
-i -i if stations have preferences (v1, v2) such that 
-1 -2 -1 -2 v1 
+ v1 < c1 and v2 + v2 > c2 
where 
-z CZ > vl 
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z -2 2 -1 1 v1 > v2 > B and c1 > v2 > B , 
weak-efficiency requires that the second program is produced, i. e. 
F(m) = (0, 1, 0, 0). 
Now let us suppose that station 1 has preferences given 
1 1 � � by (v1, vz) and station 2 has preferences (v1, vz). Thus 
where 
1 � 1 � v1 + v1 > c1 and v2 + v2 > CZ 
1 1 -2 -Z v2 > v1 and v1 > v2 
Here, weak-efficiency only requires that either program be produced. 
However, if F(m) = (0, 1, 0, 0), then station 2 has the incentive to
misreveal its preferences as (v� , v;) which will cause the first 
program to be produced. On the other hand, if F(m) = (1, 0, 0, 0), 
-1 -1 then station 1 will misreveal his preferences as (v1, v2) to 
guarantee production of program two. Thus this example proves 
the following impossibility result: 
> Proposition: If P = 2 and F is weakly efficient then F is not 
nonstrategic. 
V. Concluding Remarks 
From our search for a satifactory mechanism we are left 
with the following observation. If we wish to continue with the 
class of deterministic mechanisms we must allow for some strategic 
behavior, but this creates a major implementation difficulty. 
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The mechanisms described in the previous section are static 
mappings between agents' messages and final allocations. This 
static property is relatively unobjectionable when the agents 
have dominant strategies but if dominant strategies do not exist, 
such mechanisTIEmust be implemented as adjustment procedures. 
With the exception of Smith [11], there has been little attention 
paid to the problem of modeling such institutions and the theore-
tical analysis of the associated adjustment procedures is lacking. 
Due to this we are left to analyze the properties of competing 
institutionsthrough the use of laboratory experiments (see [4]) in 
order to compare their properties under different evaluative 
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